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4 The human life course 
as context of development
In its most basic sense, development can be described as movement through time. As such,
it can easily be recognized in the occurrence of change. Such a simple characterization,
however, conceals the true complexity of understanding development. The notion of
development implies more than arbitrary change (Breeuwsma, 1993; Van Haaften, Korthals
& Wren, 1997; Van Geert, 1986b; Werner, 1967). It is also grounded on the supposition that the
observed changes represent a clearly identifiable pattern of regularities. This subsequently
raises the question where this dynamic coherence originates, especially when the developing
object under scrutiny is the individual, navigating through the course of life (c.f. Breeuwsma,
1994; Widdershoven, 1994). Is personal development over the lifespan dictated by
ontogenetic laws that apply to each and every one of us? Is it the byproduct of growing up in
a demanding environment, so that each social setting generates its own standards for proper
development? Or is it something for which we as autonomous, self-conscious individuals are
responsible ourselves, resulting in a wide variety of biographical trajectories that can only be
described at an idiographic level? From the previous chapters, it may be clear that all three
developmental stances apply to the topic of personal self-definition over the lifespan. To
direct their lives in a personally valid way, people have to deal with the possibilities and
limitations of their social environment from an understanding of their own dispositions and
preferences, using all the mental and social resources that they have at their disposal. In other
words, personal self-definition is by nature a transactional process in which different levels
of development must be coordinated.
A further complication in understanding the developmental implications of personal
self-definition over the lifespan is that it exceeds mere maturation. As discussed in the
previous chapter on identity development, the relevance of personal self-definition extends
beyond the adolescent identity crisis. The suggestion that there is only one critical period in
which the maturing individual must for once and for all plot the course for the rest of his or
her life mainly results from a too selective reading of Erikson’s work. Rather, from a growing
body of literature, it is obvious that identity threatening changes are no longer restricted to
the ontogenetically defined transitions of adolescence, but originate more and more from
recurrent shifts in the relation between the individual and his or her social context. Since
both individual and context are liable to further change, a continuing mutual attunement is
inevitable. In our society, the choices that are made during adolescence hardly last an entire
lifetime (e.g. Côté, 1996b; Marcia, 1994; Stephen et al., 1992; Waterman, 1993). This can
hardly be otherwise. One cannot expect adolescents – or adults, for that matter – to have such
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an encompassing view on human existence that it accounts for all contingencies of life and
does not need to evolve any further. Besides, the goals, expectations, and images that people
use to fashion and evaluate their own trajectory through life appear to a considerable extent
to be age-specific (e.g. Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Cantor et al., 1987; Heckhausen &
Krueger, 1987; Neugarten, 1969, 1979; Neugarten & Neugarten, 1986; Nurmi, 1992, 1993;
Ryff, 1991; Settersten, 1997; Viney, 1992). Judging by the literature, adolescence proves to
be marked by a strong preoccupation with meeting the proper social images and roles and
with finding one’s own niche. In adulthood, the consolidating efforts of self-improvement
prevail: the main focus is on ‘settling down’, ‘getting ahead’, and ‘counting one’s blessings’.
At an older age, finally, people appear to limit themselves to maintaining a reasonable degree
of wellbeing, notwithstanding the physical, mental, and social impairments that accompany
the process of aging. Thus, when people start to reflect upon themselves, this is always done
from the viewpoint of what is considered appropriate or inevitable at a certain age. Therefore,
it is of no surprise to see self- as well as identity psychologists start applying models of
lifespan development (cf. Berzonsky, 1990; Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Cross & Markus, 1991;
Kroger, 2000; Ryff, 1991; Whitbourne, Zuschlag, Elliot, & Waterman, 1992). And since the
subjective stance of individuals is an important mediating factor in the way in which age
affects their functioning as a person, it is neither a surprise that lifespan developmentalists
in turn appeal to the notions of self and identity as the guiding principles of lifespan
development (cf. Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Chapman, 1984; Elder, 1998; Filipp & Klauer,
1986; Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993). 
We will conclude our theoretical explorations by outlining a lifespan psychological
account of personal self-definition in which the awareness of self-definition problems plays
a crucial role. Our discussion of the guiding principles that according to lifespan
developmentalists shape the human life course is for an important part based on Gerrit
Breeuwsma’s comprehensive analysis of lifespan development models (1993, 1994).
Lifespan psychology is not just a matter of stretching the developmental period from
childhood to adulthood. It also pretends to constitute a paradigmatic shift in understanding
human development (Baltes, 1987; Baltes, Lindenberger & Staudinger, 1998; Elder, 1998;
Breeuwsma, 1993, 1994). Especially in the last twenty years, lifespan developmentalists are
abandoning the classical ontogenetic notion of development in favor of a more transactional,
contextualized view on human development (e.g. Abeles, 1987; Baltes, 1987; Baltes, Reese &
Lipsitt, 1980; Baltes et al., 1998; Brandtstädter, 1998; Bornstein & Bruner, 1989; Dannefer
& Perlmutter, 1990; Featherman & Lerner, 1985; Lerner, 1989, 1998). Psychological
development is no longer equated with maturation, but situated in the mutual attunement
processes that interweave individual and context. As a consequence, the ongoing dialectics
of development are stressed rather than a unilateral unfolding of qualities that are already
present in rudimentary form, and intra- and inter-individual variation in developmental
trajectories rather than a priori postulating all kinds of universals. The individual no longer
counts as an organism that is dictated by the laws of human ontogenesis, but a determinant
of development in its own right, or to use the much repeated words of Lerner and Busch-
Rossnagel (1981), ‘a producer of one’s own development’.
That the study of personal self-definition and a lifespan perspective on human
development could very well go hand in hand is shown by an extensive chapter of Jochem
Brandtstädter in the 1998’ Handbook of Child Psychology. Here, Brandtstädter presents an
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elaborate theoretical outline of an action perspective on lifespan human development. He
commences with stipulating the importance of self-reflexive mediation in the way we, as
humans, try to direct our own development: “Through action, and through experiencing the
consequences of our actions, we construe representations of ourselves and of our material,
social, and symbolic environments, and these representations guide and motivate activities
by which we shape and influence our behavior and personal development.” (p. 807). Notice
that these very same words could just as well apply to the praxis of personal self-definition.
A few moments later, he formulates some additional specifications for a study that situates
self-definition within the whole of the human lifespan:
The central tenet of an action-theoretical perspective thus holds that human ontogeny, including
adulthood and later life, cannot be understood adequately without paying heed to the self-reflective
and self-regulative loops that link developmental changes to the ways in which individuals, in
actions and mentation, construe their personal development. This should not be read to imply that
individuals are the sole or omnipotent producers of their biographies. Like any other type of
activity, activities related to personal development are subject to cultural, sociohistorical, and
physical constraints. These constraints lie partly or even completely outside of one’s span of
control, but they decisively structure the range of behavioral and developmental options. Action-
theoretical perspectives on development must therefore consider not only the activities through
which individuals try to control their development over the life course, but also the non-personal
or sub-personal forces that canalize such activities. (pp. 807-808)
With this qualification, Brandtstädter points out that the self-defining activities of individuals
are embedded in a context of developmental conditions that for an important part fall beyond
the systematic control of the individual. Actually, people stand in a rather haphazard relation
with their own development. Active self-definition depends largely on those decisive
moments in life where the individual is caught by the realization that one’s own goals and
potentials are in conflict with the chronology in the demands and opportunities of the
currently existing physical, social and cultural situation. For example, habitual role patterns
may cease to exist or prove to be counter-productive; we may discover that we cannot
adequately account for the direction that our life has took; due to unforeseen circumstances,
we may find ourselves in awkward situations; we may feel ourselves dictated by circum-
stances and stigmatized by others or, oppositely, lost in a profusion of new possibilities;
actions and decisions might be noticed to have unintentional side-effects, and so on. It is at
such moments, that we realize the necessity of a thorough reorientation on ‘whom we are
and where we want to go’.
Brandtstädter stresses the importance of conflict and contradiction by explicitly
adhering to a dialectical view on human development, as advocated by Riegel (1975, 1976).
Riegel strongly opposed to a psychology that places a high premium on stability, tranquility,
equilibrium, and consistency, because such a psychology endorses a too static and well-
balanced depiction of human reality: “Instead of directing our attention toward the question
of how tranquility of mind or a social situation is achieved, for example, of how problems 
are solved and answers are found, at least equal emphasis should be devoted to the issue of
how problems are created and questions are raised.” (1976, p. 689). According to Riegel, the
emergence of contradiction and imbalance are the actual driving forces behind development,
whereas stability and equilibrium are nothing but transitory states in the flux of events. The
reason for this has to do with the fact that human existence involves a continuous
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coordination of inner-biological, individual-psychological, cultural-sociological, and outer-
physical processes. Human development should therefore not regarded to be a matter of
gradually achieving the optimal balance between inner maturation and a preordained reality
principle, as Piaget thought. Instead, it should be understood in terms of a continuous
synchronization between the changing individual and a changing world. Whenever, 
through the exigencies of everyday life, this synchronization breaks down, a crisis might
arise. Although such a discordant situation will have a disrupting impact on the daily 
routine, it may also prompt individuals to a critical reflection upon their own existential
conditions in an effort to restore the fit between inner and outer world (c.f. Verhofstadt-
Denève, 1994).
Because of Riegel’s untimely death in 1977, his proposal for a dialectical account of
human development hardly outgrew the status of a manifesto. Nonetheless, as the following
pages will show, the gist of his ideas keeps returning in the present understanding of lifespan
development as an ongoing coordination between individual and context. All models of
lifespan development pitch the individual and the context against each other as being the two
decisive quantities in the description and explanation of human development. However,
some lifespan developmentalists tend to concentrate on the context of development, trying
to uncover how the interplay of biological, psychological, and social influences over the
lifespan constrains or fosters the inter- and intra-individual variation in developmental
trajectories. Other developmentalists are more inclined to emphasize the steering activities
by which self-conscious individuals try to introduce a sense of coherence and direction into
their own lives. Therefore, our discussion of the lifespan developmental psychology is written
as a diptych, the present chapter being devoted to the life course as a temporal context that
may force people to redefine themselves, and a second chapter to the transactional processes
by which individuals coordinate the changes that they experience (see Chapter Five).
In the present chapter, we will focus on the conditions that shape human development
over the course of life. In Section 4.1, we will start with a short introduction in classical
developmental logic. This will provide us with the ‘antithetical’ basis to fully appreciate the
complexity of understanding and explaining the dynamics of lifespan development. It will
also help us to determine the precise status of Erikson’s developmental thinking. Should he
be reckoned among the classical ontogeneticists or was he in fact anticipating current
insights in lifespan psychology? As will be discussed in Section 4.2, Erikson can best be
regarded as a transitional figure. On the one hand, in his model of ego-development, he
appeals to the human life cycle as a frame of reference that all individuals have in common,
thus embracing a standardized notion of development. On the other hand, however, he
simultaneously acknowledges that modern life requires individuals to give their own life a
highly personal interpretation, advancing a more subjectivized notion of development. To
date, the limited body of empirical evidence indeed seems to corroborate the existence of
common themes over the lifespan, but also a considerable amount of inter- and intra-
individual variation in the emergence of these themes over the lifespan. This latter finding
corresponds with a contextualized, transactional view on lifespan development, as described
in Section 4.3. The transactional approach stresses the inherent plasticity of human
development, as being the compound resultant of an intricate interplay of biological,
psychological, and sociological factors. Some of these factors are strictly age-related, others
are rather cohort-related, and still others only have a coincidental impact on the course of
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development. In either capacity, these developmental influences are of particular relevance
to the study of the self-definition problems that people may experience over the lifespan: they
constitute the temporal setting in which personal self-definition over the lifespan takes
shape. We conclude our discussion of the context of development by addressing a
characteristic complication in lifespan developmental studies (Section 4.4). Any researcher
who holds the view that human development is the result of a complex of interacting
developmental factors, varying from biological to social, must deal with the methodological
problem of identifying the proper causes behind the observed temporal changes. It may for
instance be tempting to directly attribute age-effects to certain maturational processes,
whereas they actually should be attributed to the specific socio-cultural circumstances in
which the different birth cohorts have grown up. Also, people may vary considerable in the
degree to which such group tendencies find expression, depending upon more idiosyncratic
characteristics.
4.1 A short introduction in developmental logic
The emergence of the lifespan approach in developmental psychology over the last twenty
years can be seen as a reaction to the rigidity with which the classical ontogenetic theories
tried to lay down the age-related transformations in human functioning (Baltes, 1987;
Lerner, Perkins, & Jacobson, 1993; Breeuwsma, 1993, 1994). Traditional approaches of
human development are based on two kinds of developmental logic. The grand theories of
childhood development by Freud (1917), Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966/1969), and
Kohlberg (1981) are grounded on the principle of psychological maturation, whereas early
lifespan developmentalists such as Bühler (1933), Jung (1931), Loevinger (1976), and Erikson
(1950/1983, 1968) took the human life cycle as their starting point. The difference between
these two foundations of developmental thinking is less decisive than appears. The notion of
the human life cycle just complements the developmental force of maturation with that of
aging. In both cases, the developmental logic advances a more or less deterministic and
prescriptive view on human development. As we will discuss, this also holds for a considerable
part for Erikson’s epigenetic model of ego-development, but not for his speculations about
the constructive and transactional role of identity in adolescent and adult life.
The linear logic of maturation
In their systematic analysis of the foundations of developmental thought, Breeuwsma (1993,
1994) and Van Geert (1986a) observed that the traditional notions about childhood
development are strongly grounded in nineteenth century biological thinking about organic
growth (see also Baltes et al., 1998; Lerner, 1989; Lerner et al., 1993). Traditionally, human
development is primarily seen as a maturational process that both culminates and is
completed in the stable end-state of optimal adult functioning. Of course, this corresponds
with our common sense understanding of adults as ‘grown ups’ or ‘mature individuals’.
What distinguishes the scientific from a common sense understanding, however, is its
formal conceptualization of development (Breeuwsma, 1994). To arrange discrete temporal
changes into a coherent developmental theory, the experts have at their disposal two
important conceptual tools (Sternberg, 1984; Van Geert, 1986a). The first are the qualitative
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stages to describe the different levels of developmental progress, the second are the
generative mechanisms that are considered to be responsible for the transition from one
stage to another. Of these two sets of tools, the proposed generative mechanisms generally
are of such an abstract, non-specific nature – think of Piaget’s assimilation and accommodation
as the mechanisms of progressive adaptation (1970/1972), and Werner’s differentiation and
integration as the mechanisms of progressive organization (1967; see also Werner & Kaplan,
1963) – that they cannot in themselves account for the concrete direction that development
takes. For a systematic description of a specific developmental pathway, ontogeneticists
therefore have to turn to their preconceptions about what counts as mature functioning. This
provides them with a normative yardstick to divide the assumed developmental progress into
an orderly sequence of successive qualitative stages. Yet, judging development by the
standards of maturation makes it difficult to distinguish a mere descriptive conceptualization
of development from a more prescriptive one.
The textbook example of a classical approach is Piaget’s stage-theory of cognitive
development (e.g. Piaget & Inhelder, 1966/1969). Starting from hypothetico-deductive
thinking as the gold standard of epistemological sophistication, the certainty of birth as the
starting point of any active participation in the outer world, and adolescence as its
maturational endpoint, Piaget described cognitive development as a succession of epistemic
advancements that follows a rather defined timetable (Piaget, 1970/1972; Piaget et al.,
1968/1977). His cognitive-operational model starts with the infancy phase, when newborns,
through their interactions with their environment, learn to differentiate their innate reflexes
into reliable sensori-motoric schemata that reflect the operational affordances of the
surrounding object-world. At 18 months, toddlers begin to display instances of symbolic
representation. Through the referential use of objects and gestures, and through the first
linguistic utterances, they start to thread together an imaginary world of meaning. Yet, any
understanding of the causal relations in the natural world emerges, according to Piaget, no
earlier than in the primary school years. By then, children are able to perform the mental
steps that are necessary to appreciate the ways in which different phenomena and states may be
related. They are, however, still led by outward appearances – as shown by the conservation
task –, thus overlooking the underlying regularities. Only at the onset of adolescence,
children can finally be expected to apply the formal operations that are needed to uncover the
abstract laws and principles behind reality.
The most characteristic feature of Piaget ‘s model – and in its wake of most other stage
models of development – is that it explains development not as a byproduct of socialization,
but as an orderly expansion of potential. Moreover, this expansion is supposed to proceed
according to a ground plan: a preformatted sequence of developmental stages that eventually
links the maturing individual with objective reality in the most optimal way. Yet, Breeuwsma
as well as Van Geert point out that the rationale for such an unfolding in fact follows a
retrospective direction (see also Chapman, 1988). It crucially hinges on the invariability with
which all ingredients of the supposed optimal level of functioning are present at a certain
age, and on the likelihood that no further advancements are conceivable. In Piaget’s theory,
for instance, cognitive development is completed when the adolescent learns to apply the
kind of formal logic that according to our present scientific insights are the best guarantee
to uncover the principles of reality. Moreover, our whole education is geared to familiarize
pupils with such principles of hypothetico-deductive thinking, turning Piaget’s developmental
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assumptions into a self-fulfilling prophecy. When there are sufficient grounds to postulate
an end-state in development, it can subsequently be used to recursively determine which
functional properties are still absent in the preceding periods and which changes must be
established to reach the optimal level of equilibrium. Such a prescriptive framework affords
the classification of temporal changes into a logical developmental pattern, as if they follow
an intrinsic functional order, a natural teleology (i.e., towards formal operational thought as
the best way to represent the underlying regularities of objective reality). As a result, retro-
spective conceptualizations typically depict development as a unidimensional, unilinear, and
unidirectional process, with the end-state as its necessary outcome. The role of the context is
considered to be of secondary importance. It is only granted an accelerating or detrimental
influence on the progress of development, and not having any decisive effect on the direction
that it takes. Coincidental changes or events, let alone personal orientations, are even denied
to have any systematic influence. Thus, human development is de facto described as a closed
process (Van Geert, 1986b).
The circular logic of the life cycle
Early notions of lifespan development, too, are imbued with a structuralistic teleology, though
with one inevitable modification. The developmental forces of growth and maturation are
complemented by the antagonistic tendencies of aging and decline (Baltes et al., 1998;
Breeuwsma, 1993, 1994; Schroots, 1995, 1996). At the root of this addition lies an implicit
physiological model that considers the human life course to be the compound derivative of
both functions, with growth dominating the first years and decline the later years of life. This
prototypical trend can best be described through the hill-metaphor (Schroots, 1995, 1996).
In terms of a graph – with the human life cycle on the X-axis, the level of functioning on the
Y-axis, and birth as zero –, life is typically depicted as a bell-curve (Baltes et al., 1998). In
terms of stages, it can be divided in a maturation phase (childhood), a more or less stationary
phase (adulthood), a phase of decline (old age), and a terminal phase (death). So, when the
classical approach of development is stretched to cover the whole lifespan, the more linear
image of a maturational process is replaced by that of the life cycle (Breeuwsma, 1993), and
the optimal end-state of adulthood by the ultimate end-state of death.
This developmental logic clearly returns in the ideas of the direct predecessors of
contemporary lifespan psychology – such as Charlotte Bühler (1933), Robert Havighurst
(1953), Carl Gustav Jung (1931), Jane Loevinger (1976), and of course Erik Erikson
(1950/1963, 1968). Based on their preconceptions about what constitutes a meaningful life,
they too understood development as a stepwise progression that follows – or at least should
follow – a prescribed, more or less age-specific ground pattern. Because their theories extend
over the whole human lifespan, it is obvious that the criterion of maturation is insufficient to
ground any subdivision of adult development in separate stages. Instead, the developmental
stages of adulthood are grafted on a thematic division of life into separate life phases. Each
life phase is considered to correspond with its own normative set of psychosocial tasks or
crises (for instance, coping with retirement or the ‘empty nest’ in later adulthood), which
have to be resolved in a constructive way in order to promote further development.
Such life cycle accounts are however notoriously weak in their justification of the
proper developmental course. Where classical ontogenetic models can fall back on the
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requirements of an optimal level of functioning as the standard of development, lifespan
theories have to include the finiteness of our existence. Though death is an undeniable fact
of life, it can – when stripped from its more spiritual, religious connotations – hardly be
considered a normative telos of development. On the other hand, however, humans can
anticipate their own mortality. The psychological significance of death therefore lies in the
fact that it is a ‘virtual life-phase’ (Breeuwsma, 1994, p. 313), an imaginary construction that
people can use as the ultimate touchstone of their lives when the prospect of death becomes
a reality for them.
The importance of this projective orientation is clearly recognizable in the classical
theories of lifespan development. Bühler, Jung, Erikson, and Loevinger all propagate, more
or less explicitly, an ideology of self-actualization: in order to age successfully, people have to
master the current existential conditions in a way that permits them to maximize their
personal potentials, with the possibility of death representing the final challenge. How open
this more prospective interpretation of lifespan development may sound, the
aforementioned authors all concur to some degree in their emphasis on the life cycle as an
invariant, hierarchically ordered framework of self-actualization. Take for example the
remarkable converge in the way they have specified old age as the final developmental stage.
In Bühler’s theory, people in the last stage of their lives are or at least should be concerned
with the task of drawing up the balance sheet of their lives in terms of the life-goals that
eventually have been fulfilled. For Jung, finding meaning and wholeness in life is a central
requisite to accept death. Both Erikson and Loevinger, finally, stress the importance of
finding integrity in life in order to protect oneself from the despair that in the end one’s past
life may not have been worthwhile living. In other words, in order to cope with the prospect of
death, people invariably must be convinced that their life has had some purpose. From our current
scientific standards, however, these classic theories of ever-extending self-actualization seem
to be grounded on a humanistic view of life rather than sound empirical proof. Whether self-
actualization is a sufficient and exclusive reason for the psychological well-being of each and
everyone of us (apart even from the tricky question how to operationalize self-actualization),
whether a proper completion of all preceding stages is a necessary precondition for a
meaningful life, and whether this must be done throughout the same, invariable sequence
of developmental tasks along a pre-set timetable, largely remains unclear.
Havighurst’s overview of the developmental tasks over the lifespan (1953) can be
regarded as the epitome of a poor developmental logic. Havighurst defines a developmental
task as “…a task which arises at or about a certain period in the life of the individual,
successful achievement of which leads to his happiness and to success with later tasks, while
failure leads to unhappiness in the individual, disapproval by the society, and difficulty with
later tasks.” (p. 2). At the concrete level, his theory is hardly more than an ad hoc enumeration
of subsequent developmental tasks. For example, with respect to adolescence, Havighurst
mentions without further corroboration a task like preparing for marriage, family life, and
an economic career, for early adulthood taking on civic responsibility and finding a congenial
social group, for middle age developing adult leisure-time activities, and at later adulthood
establishing an explicit affiliation with one’s age group. He thus describes the prototypical
biographies of Western middle class societies. Yet, he neglects to account for the processes
that must be responsible for their characteristic outlook. Consequently, his theory must be
qualified as a topological rather than a developmental model (Van Geert, 1986a). It maps the
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standard life course in our society, instead of providing a satisfactory explanation of how
coping with certain life tasks should coerce into a single developmental pattern.
4.2 Signs of ambivalence in Erikson’s developmental thinking
Viewed from our present-day scientific practice that any sound explanation of human
development should be firmly grounded in making explicit one’s theoretical suppositions, it
is difficult to clearly establish the exact status of Erikson’s ideas. With his lifespan model of
ego-development, Erikson is an unmistakable exponent of the classical developmental
thinking. He advanced from the notion of the human life cycle as a structured whole of
existential demands, repeatedly endorsing his belief in the human striving for self-
actualization. Throughout his career, his writings echo a deeply optimistic and humanistic
worldview. We may therefore be tempted to consign his work to the history books as being
based on a philosophy of life rather than sound scientific considerations. This, however, does
injustice to the subtlety of his developmental thinking. On the one hand, it lacks the
conceptual arbitrariness that for instance plagues Havighurst’s taxonomy of developmental
tasks. On the other hand, Erikson, more than any of his contemporaries, recognized that
lifespan development materializes in the interplay between a changing individual and a
changing social environment. Especially in his elaboration of identity, he explored domains
of human functioning in ways that nowadays belong to the central dicta of lifespan
development. 
To start with, Erikson’s life cycle model has all the necessary formal ingredients to
count as a classical developmental theory. It posits ego-growth (defined as progressive ego-
synthesis) as the underlying motive of lifespan development. It then describes the different
stages of ego-growth as a succession of ego-crises. The synthesizing process of achieving a
favorable ratio between the opposites of a crisis functions as the generative mechanism
behind the transition from one stage to another (Van Geert, 1986b, 1987). The strict
succession of ego-crises, as depicted in the diagonal of the epigenetic chart (see Fig. 3.1, p. 48),
lays down an invariant and age-specific pathway towards full ego-growth; each crisis has its
own critical time of ascendancy, building on the preceding ones and foreshadowing the next.
To justify this rather strict developmental claim, Erikson appeals to the epigenetic principle,
which he once defined as follows: “Anything that grows has a ground plan, and out of this
ground plan the parts arise, each having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have
arisen to form a functioning whole.” (1950/1963, p. 92). In line with the epigenetic principle,
each crisis entails a further expansion of the individual’s experiential world as he or she
moves through the life cycle. This starts with birth, when the infant must learn to trust the
outside world, and it is considered completed when one looks back on one’s life as a
meaningful part in the great chain of life. Each successful resolution of a crisis (in terms of
establishing a favorable ratio between the opposite poles of a crisis, as for instance trust vs.
mistrust) adds a new strength to the ego and implies a further step towards a more
encompassing ego-synthesis. In short, then, Erikson’s model appears to represent a
consistent developmental account, in which the stages seem to follow naturally from the
assumed epigenetic mechanisms of ego-development.
Ironically enough, nowadays, this self-contained logic is also held against Erikson.
Levenson and Crumbler (1996), for instance, accuse Erikson of being one of the ‘pure
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ontogeniticists’ (p. 136) who are blind to the cultural shaping of development or the liberative
force of individual choice. As a consequence, they reject his stage model as being too stage
specific, prescriptive, and deterministic (see also Lerner, 1989). Such a disqualification,
however, is just as premature as putting Erikson’s ideas about ego-development on a par with
Havighurst’s enumeration of developmental tasks. As we already established in Chapter
Three, Erikson’s ideas are characterized by a fundamental ambivalence. Throughout his
work, especially in his more reflective observations, Erikson repeatedly gave evidence of a
much more differentiated view on ego-development than a quick reading of the epigenetic
chart would suspect. This especially holds for the role of identity formation.
In Childhood and Society (1950/1963), for instance, Erikson indicated that the
epigenetic chart should primarily be treated as a heuristic model. He explicitly rejected any
preformationism in the epigenesis of ego-development, because such a rigidity does not
accord with the plasticity of human development. He stressed that man comes into the world
as an incomplete being, which, through prolonged and extensive socialization and training
in childhood, must acquire the cultural format that enables him to function as a proper
individual. How this exactly turns out, depends upon the child rearing practices of a certain
culture. That most cultures know a more or less fixed sequence of crises, explains Erikson
by attesting that “…the human life cycle and man’s institutions have evolved together.” (p.
250). After all, in order to preserve its stability, every society must generate age-specific,
normative expectancies and institutions that meet the increasing readiness of the maturing
individual to participate in social life. The individual, in turn, must – for its own development
as a recognizable person – give account of the existing societal resources. Both worlds
eventually meet in the formation of identity1.
Erikson’s view on identity formation transgresses a purely ontogenetic account on two
points. First, Erikson repeatedly pointed out that specific sociocultural conditions in our
present-day Western societies have played an aggravating role in the emergence of the
adolescent identity crisis. With the concept of ‘moratorium’, he refers to the institutionalized
leeway for adolescents to experiment with alternative roles, ideologies and ways of life, and
the uncertainties and doubts that accompany such an experimentation (cf. Côté & Levine,
1987, 1988a). Second, within this developmental vacuum, the subjective orientation of the
individual is regarded to play a decisive role in keeping the process of ego-synthesis going.
This is where in Erikson’s theory the ego frees itself from the psychoanalytic entanglement
between Id and Superego and becomes an active agent in its own right (Berzonsky, 1990).
By actively taking responsibility for the creation of a more or less coherent and recognizable
personal identity and maintaining its viability, the individual’s orientation on the coordination
between self and world becomes the nexus of development. This means that a more organic
dialectics between ontogenetic acquisitions and an already existing social reality is replaced
1 We remind the reader of Erikson’s argumentation behind the epigenetic chart, as cited in Chapter Three:
“The underlying assumptions of such charting are (1) that the human personality in principle develops according
to steps predetermined in the growing person’s readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with a
widening social radius; and (2) that society, in principle, tends to be so constituted as to meet and invite this
succession of potentialities for interaction and tends to safeguard and encourage the proper rate and the proper
sequence of their enfolding.” (1950/1963, p. 270). What counts in ego-development, then, is not so much the
specific shape that the connection between individual and society takes as well as its quality. Since the connection
crystallizes in the formation of a personal identity, its quality largely depends upon subjective criteria (i.e., whether
it affords a sense of personal unity and feeling recognized as such). 
by a personalized dialectics in which an individual sometimes has to adjust his or her bio-
graphy in light of the apperceived resources of the current social context (Bosma et al., 1994). 
As described in Chapter Three, the ambivalence in Erikson’s thinking about the role
of identity in ego-development prompted Côté and Levine (1987) to differentiate between a
‘stage-specific’ and a ‘life cycle’ reading of identity development. In a stage-specific reading,
the identity crisis is only one step in the ‘staircase’ (Neugarten, 1979) towards a more
complete ego-synthesis. It is preceded by the contributive crises of childhood, followed by its
extension to intimate relationships (intimacy), other generations (generativity), and
culminating in the identification with the ultimate touchstone of human life, that is, to accept
the finiteness of one’s own existence (integrity). As such, a stage-specific reading follows a
retrospective, closed modeling of development in which the proper course of development is
already predefined. What Côté and Levine call a ‘life cycle notion’ rather follows a more open,
prospective conception of development, where the adolescent identity crisis is just an initial
state of further identity development. After all, in Erikson’s work, personal identity is
conceptualized as a configuration that, once created, must be actively maintained during the
rest of the lifespan. Which direction the possible adaptations must take is not dependent
upon an absolute, a priori teleology (for instance moving towards an all-encompassing level
of integration). It is at the very most a matter of a subjective, contextualized teleology,
dependent upon the way in which further ego-crises and the exigencies of social life are
experienced by the individual as a threat to one’s existing sense of identity. Because in the
end, the individual is personally responsible for restoring a sense of continuity, unity, and
recognition, the actual trajectories of identity development are set out in terms of subjective
constructs like personal values, expectancies, plans, and goals.
Some inconclusive evidence
Unfortunately, Erikson has never made the step to systematically elaborate the more
prospective aspects of identity development or adequately integrate them into his stage
model. Because in this respect his work lacks ‘a sufficient amount of logico-conceptual rigor’
(Van Geert, 1987, p. 254), the exact relation between his more open considerations about
identity and the more traditional, normative outlook of his epigenetic model of ego-growth
remains obscure. Do the active attempts of people to coordinate their sense of identity with
the changing circumstances of the human life cycle indeed follow the prescribed sequence
of achieving a sense of intimacy, generativity, and integrity? Are these crises necessary
transitions that each and every individual has to deal with in order to maintain their status
of full-fledged personhood? Or has Erikson sketched an idealization that does not answer the
reality of everyday life? 
At this point, the empirical evidence that has accumulated since Erikson remains
inconclusive too. The first attempts to verify Erikson’s ideas about adult ego-development
were mainly illustrative, as exemplified by the studies of Levinson (1978, 1996) and Vaillant
(1977, 1993). Both authors used biographical interviews to chart common themes in the adult
life course. Rather than aiming for a critical validation of Erikson’s model, however, they
used their qualitative observations to generate an evocative description of the different stages
in adult life. Both became publicly known for their portrayal of the proverbial ‘midlife crisis’.
They depicted the early forties as an adult’s recapitulation of the adolescent identity crisis, a
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period in which one is “...reassessing and reordering the truth about adolescence and young
adulthood...” (Vaillant, 1977, p. 220), and in which one must prepare to enter the second half
of life.
In The Seasons of a Man’s Life (1978), Levinson used his interviews with around 40
men to demonstrate that the adult life course is a highly ordered, age-specific alternation of
stable and transitional periods. He for instance presented early adulthood (22 to 40 yrs.) as
a period in which the individual must gradually establish his own position in social life and
consolidate his attainments in the domain of family life and vocational career. He further
observed that all of his respondents, being in their late thirties and early forties, dissociated
themselves from this period of increasing stability and subjected it to a fundamental re-
evaluation. Levinson considered this to be a natural consequence of reaching the watershed
in life where one starts to realize that the promises of youth are finally giving way to the facts
of being middle aged. For the majority of his respondents, this turning point proved to be
accompanied by a considerable amount of inner struggle and confusion. In 1996, Levinson
published The Seasons of a Woman’s Life, in which he painted a highly converging picture for
women in their early forties. The only difference was that the women in addition had to
struggle with the traditional role conflict between motherhood and a working career.
Vaillant (1977, see also 1993) came to a similar picture in his reporting of a more
extensive study in which 268 promising college sophomores were followed throughout their
lives. Although Vaillant mainly focused on the individual differences in the way these men
adapted to the vicissitudes of life and on how such ‘ego-mechanisms’ affected their further
life course, he also found some evidence for a clear structuring of the adult lifespan. He used
Erikson’s ego-crises to describe this structure, though with two supplementary stages. Like
Levinson, he saw the period between the early twenties (intimacy) and forties (generativity)
as a period of stabilizing one’s identity. He labeled this intermediate stage ‘career
consolidation versus self-absorption’. He also extended the generativity crisis with that of
‘keeping the meaning versus rigidity’, in order to emphasize that protecting a sense of
creativity not only has to do with the transfer of expertise on others, but also with living a
productive life.
The danger of using illustrations to empirically corroborate a theory, as both Levinson
and Vaillant did, is that it is mainly geared towards verification. Confirmatory evidence is
singled out at the expense of refuting evidence, often resulting in a rather stereotypical
impression of the observed reality. More systematic attempts to find empirical support for
Erikson’s model of adult ego-growth have been made by researchers from the identity status
tradition (for an overview, see Kroger, 2000; Marcia, 1998). In order to develop reliable
measures, status researchers have extended their well-tried strategy to operationalize the
completion of a crisis in terms of different outcomes. As was the case with the identity status
model, behavioral criteria are selected that are considered of critical importance to the
individual’s way of handling a particular ego-crisis, and the occurrence of these critical
behaviors is used to determine the developmental status of the participant. This way, status
models have been developed for the crises of intimacy (e.g. Orlofsky, Marcia & Lesser, 1973;
Tesch & Whitbourne, 1982), generativity (Bradley, 1997; Bradley & Marcia, 1998), and
integrity (Hearn, Glenham, Strayer, Koopman, & Marcia, 1998; Walasky, Whitbourne, &
Nehrke, 1983-1984). For instance, according to Hearn and his co-authors, the quality of
resolving the generativity crisis in middle adulthood is thought to depend upon the presence
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of active involvement in generative pursuits, and upon the degree of inclusiveness of these
activities (whether the active care concerns self and/or others). On the basis of these two
criteria, five statuses have been defined: generative (highly involved with caring for oneself as
well as others), pseudogenerative agentic (highly involved in one’s own projects only),
pseudogenerative communal (highly oriented towards the welfare of others), conventional (a
strict adherence to traditional standards), and stagnant (no active involvement in self or
others). These status distinctions appeared to have sufficient discriminant validity to count
as different outcomes of the generativity crisis. Yet, to our opinion, they also suffer from the
same shortcomings that are attached to the identity status approach (see Chapter 3). In
particular, it is automatically assumed that the crisis that is investigated must be relevant to
the experiential world of the matching age group. As a result, none of these studies has
actually addressed the issue as to whether ego-development over the lifespan does indeed
follow the assumed sequence of ego-crises. 
The only comprehensive attempt so far to investigate the age-characteristics of
Erikson’s epigenetic sequence of ego-crises was by Whitbourne, Zuschlag, Elliot, and
Waterman (1992). They used an extended version of Constantinople’s Inventory of
Psychosocial Development to measure a successful resolution for all eight crises
simultaneously. Moreover, they did this by using a sequential design that spanned a period
of 22 years. This permitted them to compare different adult age groups as well as cohorts
(ranging from 20 to 42 years of age). Consistent with Erikson’s theory, for most crises a
positive age trend was found, cross-sectionally as well as longitudinally – that is, the older the
participants, the higher the proportion of positive resolutions. Yet, the most remarkable
findings appeared counterintuitive. The strongest age-effects were not found in the crises
that should have their maximal ascendancy given the age of the participants (intimacy vs.
isolation and generativity vs. stagnation), but in the crises that either should have been
resolved already (i.e. industry) or should still lie beyond the experiential horizon (i.e.
integrity). In other words, the ‘off-diagonal’ components in the extended version of Erikson’s
epigenetic diagram (see Fig. 3.4, p. 63) proved to be of vital importance. Moreover, the
developmental change in the resolution of the integrity crisis was in the opposite direction.
Longitudinally as well as cohort-wise, a relatively sharp decrease in integrity scores was
found, instead of the expected increase. The authors explain this remarkable finding by
suggesting that it probably reflects the cultural turn from the romantic idealism of the sixties
and early seventies, with its celebration of self-actualization, to the New Realism of the
eighties, in which such spiritual issues were disposed of as navel-gazing. Therefore, the
researchers concluded that:
… the sequencing of Erikson’s stages is not unidirectional and that there is not an epigenetic
unfolding of developmental issues. Rather, all psychosocial issues can reach ascendancy at any
particular time in the individual’s life, depending on unique factors specific to that individual’s
biological, psychological, or social trajectories. (p. 270).
It is this kind of intricate findings that asked for a more open, relativistic understanding of
human development, an understanding that would do more justice to the large inter- and
intra-individual variation in developmental trajectories through life. 
4.2 A contextual view on lifespan developmen
Stressing the inherent plasticity of human development has become one of the most
important hallmarks of contemporary lifespan approaches (Lerner & Tubman, 1989). In the
seventies, when the first empirical studies into adulthood development were initiated, the
classical, biology-based stage models quickly proved to be too rigid to describe the actual
variety in individual trajectories (Baltes, 1987; Breeuwsma, 1993, 1994; Lerner, 1998). To
start with, it was hardly possible to establish a common factor between the decisive issues of
adult life (Breeuwsma, 1994). For example, what is exactly the general psychological
significance of domestic life or a working career, or of their diminishing importance with
aging? What connects a divorce with disease, and what a midlife crisis with getting married?
It may be obvious that it is hard to ascribe a single developmental dimension to such widely
diverging issues, let alone to order them into a coherent developmental sequence. Moreover,
even in a relatively clear-cut domain like intellectual development, considerable inter- and
intra-individual variation could be found, both in the timing and prevalence of the predicted
change (Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998; Schaie, 1996). After all, up to an advanced age
cognitive training and education fosters a high level of cognitive functioning, with a lack of
frequent stimulation having a detrimental effect. To use Whitbourne’s (1996a) acronym
UIOLI, it is a matter of ‘using it or losing it’.
As a result, it became increasingly difficult to maintain that lifespan development
implies ‘a simple movement toward higher efficacy’ (Baltes, 1987, p. 613), after which it
subsequently goes downhill, as assumed in the classical models. Rather, each moment in life
is “…a joint expression of features of growth (gain) and decline (loss). ...any developmental
progression displays at the same time new adaptive capacity as well as the loss of previously
existing capacity.” (p. 616). Also, the establishment of considerable birth cohort effects has
led to the acknowledgement that developmental trajectories are to an important degree shaped
by the sociocultural circumstances in which development and transference of development
takes place (see also Elder, 1998; Schweder et al., 1998). All these observations asked for a more
open reconceptualization of lifespan development in which the direction of development to
a large extent depends on the personal and sociocultural circumstances of the individual.
By now, there is a reasonable consensus about the central tenets of lifespan developmental
psychology (Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998; Breeuwsma, 1993, 1994). The following definition
of the lifespan approach by Abeles (1987, p. 3) comprises the four most basic premises:
1. Developmental change and aging form a continuing process, not limited to any particular age.
Development is a life-long process.
2. Change occurs in various interrelated social, psychological, and biological domains of human
behavior and functioning. Development is multidimensional.
3. Change occurs in different patterns defined over many attributes of human behavior and
functioning. Development is multidirectional.
4. Behavioral change reflects complex interactions of social, psychological, and biological
processes over the life course of individuals and over historical time. Development is 
multidetermined.
By emphasizing the nonrestrictive, multidimensional, multidirectional, and multideterministic
nature of development, lifespan developmentalists do not want to convey the impression that
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‘anything goes’, as if there exists an unlimited variety of developmental trajectories. The
actual point is that an organistic view on development should be substituted by a contextual
view that places the process of development at the intersection of intra-individual and
environmental influences (e.g. Baltes, Reese & Lipsitt, 1980; Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998;
Bornstein & Bruner, 1989; Brandtstädter, 1998; Featherman & Lerner, 1985; Lerner, Perkins
& Jacobson, 1993; Lerner, 1998; Lerner & Tubman, 1989). Development is no longer
conceived to be a process that is exclusively dictated by maturation or the strict features of a
standardized life cycle, but the compound resultant of the transactional interplay and active
adaptation between irreducible, but mutually constitutive biological, psychological, and
social levels of coordination.
Figure 4.1: The transactional interplay of developmental determinants and influences
Basic determinants Influences on development
More concretely, Baltes, Reese en Lipsitt (1980) have distinguished three sets of influences
on lifespan development, which in mutual interaction and mediated by the developing
individual are responsible for the course of development (see also Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998).
These are respectively the normative age-graded, the history-graded, and the non-normative
influences (see Figure 4.1). The first set consists of influences that are age-specific through
the immediate or socially and psychologically mediated effects of maturation and aging. The
second set consists of influences that are age-specific because of the sociohistorical circumstances
in which members of the same birth cohort have grown up. The third set of influences,
finally, consists of the more coincidental ones that are not specifically tied to a certain age.
Together, these sets of influences shape the temporal setting in which the developmental
trajectories of individuals must be realized. However, each type of influences does so in its
own way. We will therefore shortly go into the possible impact on personal self-definition for
each of these sets separately.
The chronology of age-gradation












factors have been and still are the exclusive focus of most developmental psychologists.
Baltes and his colleagues (1980) define this set as the whole of biological and environmental
determinants that are strongly connected with chronological age and as such apply to a
majority of individuals in a culture. Age-graded factors are therefore fairly predictable in their
temporal sequence, both qua onset and duration (Baltes, 1987). Because they have a strong
standardizing effect on the potential developmental pathways to and through adulthood in a
certain culture or subculture, they count as normative.
The biological dispositions associated with physical maturation and aging, such as
physical growth, puberty, menopause, and the gradual deterioration of physical abilities form
the most obvious class of age-graded determinants. However, the relation between the
biological determinants and the eventual development of psychological functioning is an
indirect one (Baltes, 1997; Baltes et al., 1998; Brandtstädter, 1998; Bruner, 1990a, 1990b;
Lerner, 1998; Lerner & Tubman, 1989). After all, the ‘incomplete architecture of human
ontogeny’ (Baltes, 1997, p. 366; see also Baltes et al., 1998) and the unprecedented slow rate
of postnatal maturation, extending well into adulthood, leaves us humans with a relative lack
of innate adaptive reflexes. This incomplete machinery impairs the organismic abilities for
survival, but simultaneously gives us the necessary plasticity to become effective participants
of an enculturated social environment. We learn to compensate for our physical deficiencies
by making use of the prosthetic tools that our culture has to offer (Baltes, 1997; Bruner,
1990a; Brandtstädter, 1998). For instance, it is only by learning to communicate with the
caretaker that the infant learns to coordinate its own actions into a meaningful scenario
(Fogel, 1993). The same tools also enable us to function effectively up to an advanced age
(Baltes et al., 1998; Brandtstädter, 1998; Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994). Think for instance
of the use of written language as a mnemonic aid to overcome the handicapping effects of a
failing memory. Baltes cum suis (1998) summarize this logic as follows:
Thus, human development the way we know it in the modern world is essentially and necessarily
tied to the evolution of culture. And the further we expect human ontogenesis to extend itself into
adult life and old age, the more it will be necessary for particular cultural factors and resources to
make this possible. (p. 1038)
Consequently, although our maturing and aging physiology may set the initial constraints
for development, it is only in interaction with our active participation in culture that the
actual canalization of developmental trajectories takes place (Bornstein & Bruner, 1989;
Bruner, 1990a; Brandtstädter, 1998).
We may therefore safely conclude that the different ways in which society through its
institutions and images anticipates the biological changes over the lifespan are an intrinsic
part of the set of age-graded determinants (Breeuwsma, 1994; Kohli & Meyer, 1986; Nurmi,
1992; Settersten, 1997). For example, in most traditional cultures, adolescence is marked by
more or less explicit rites of passage that help to emphasize the transition from childhood to
full man- or womanhood (i.e., circumcision or clitoridectomy). In the present western
societies, the same functions are performed by age-specific legislation, by a formalized
educational system, and not in the least by the public image of adolescence as being a
temporary phase of storm and stress, marked by rebellion, cliques, and testing the limits.
Such standardized demarcations of the human life course also influence the private
preconceptions that people have about the course of their personal lives. The fact that they
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adjust their goals and expectations of life to what is considered appropriate for their age in
turn perpetuates the existing canalization of development in society (Brandtstädter, 1998;
Dannefer & Perlmutter, 1990; Kohli & Meyer, 1986). All this can have a strong chronologizing
effect. People treat their normative expectations as a kind of ‘life-plan calendar’ (Giddens,
1991, p. 85) from which they can read if their lives proceed according to schedule. Because
people tend to judge themselves as well as each other by such ‘age-linked temporal maps’
(Settersten, 1997, p. 258), much of this age-grading takes place in domains where social
relationships set the standards for proper and improper age-roles. Consider for instance the
prototypical age of childbirth. In our society, women who have children at the ‘normal’ age
are fluently assimilated in the world of public motherhood, whereas teenage mothers will
often meet blunt disapproval, just as women who stay childless after their thirties become
the object of secret ridicule.
According to some authors (Kohli & Meyer, 1986; Held, 1986), the standardization of
the human life course should not be overstated. The increasing complexity of our society also
results in a further de-institutionalization and flexibility of the typical life course. The present
job mobility and a more calculating family planning indeed appear to indicate an
unprecedented freedom for people to arrange their lives in their own terms. More and more,
we live in an ‘age irrelevant’ society (Neugarten, 1979). As a consequence, a socially enforced
chronologization of the life course seems to give way to an individualistic coordination. Still,
even here, our society plays a canonical role. Through language and communication, it
provides the symbolic devices that people use to motivate their own trajectory through life in
a publicly acceptable way (Brandtstädter, 1998; Bruner, 1990a, 1990b; Dannefer &
Perlmutter, 1990). People learn to employ a folk-psychological framework in which the
language of personhood – being an agent with intentions, needs, desires, ideals, goals,
convictions, and commitments – gives flesh to the whole idea of personal development. This
helps them to frame their experiences in an understandable way, and control and negotiate
their attempts to direct their own life.
The synchrony of sociohistorical conditions
This brings us to the second set of normative influences, that is, the history-graded
determinants. Given the permanent interaction between ontogenesis and the cultural
institutionalization of the human life cycle, it is very likely that the unique sociohistoric
circumstances in which people are growing up affect their development. Such influences
may also count as normative, provided that they occur to most members of a birth cohort in
a similar and equally decisive way. Especially in times of rapid social and historic change,
adjacent birth cohorts become strongly differentiated. This has to do with the fact that the
impact of the sociohistorical events is contingent on when they occur in life (Elder, 1998).
Elder’s seminal study Children of the Great Depression (1974), for example, describes how the
age at which children go through this period of economic malaise strongly affected their
further life course. One of the most decisive consequences of the Depression was that it
disturbed the conventional family relations. The father was no longer the sole provider, but
the entire family had to be called in to manage with poverty. For adolescents, this constituted
a unique opportunity to acquire social autonomy at an early age. This head start fostered a
lasting self-confidence in the ability to take initiative in life. On the other hand, for the young
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children who were still in their dependency phase, the same period implied an irreparable
threat to their need for social security, marking their further attitude to life. An even more
compelling example is Wohl’s study (1979) of the European young men who returned from
the trenches of World War I and were unable to reconcile themselves with the banality of
civilian life again2. Other comparable instances of decisive historical events are political or
cultural revolutions, and the occurrence of natural disasters. In addition, more systematic
mutations in existing demographic and institutional structures play an important role. For
instance, because of the improved healthcare and living conditions, the average life
expectancy in the West has increased from 45 years at the beginning of this century to the
present 75 years (Baltes et al., 1998). This way, an unprecedented life phase has been added
to the prototypical human life cycle, saddling people with the problem to find a meaningful
way to spend these extra years.
Sociohistorical circumstances do not only affect the existing ‘opportunity structure’
(Kohli & Meyer, 1986), that is, the constellation of limitations and resources in which
individuals must realize their lives. They also shape the prevailing Zeitgeist. Because
members of the same birth cohort grow up in comparatively similar social circumstances
and dynamics, they often share the same social experiences (Wohl, 1979) and the same
cultural interests, habits, tastes, vocabularies, and ideologies that are currently in vogue
(Newman, 1996; Rubin, Rahhal & Poon, 1998). When such common frames of reference
are so pervasive that the members identify themselves primarily with their contemporaries
and distance themselves from adjacent age groups, a birth cohort becomes a ‘strong
generation’ where personal identities are firmly entrenched in a pronounced generational
consciousness (Newman, 1996). We only have to think of the protest generation of the sixties
or the bitter cynicism of Wohl’s World War One veterans.
One of the most compelling features of such a generational consciousness is the way
in which the individual members of a generation tend to interpret, express, and codify their
personal experiences. This brings us back to the issue of Western modernization and its
repercussions on the emergence of an individuality-oriented ideology. As we have discussed
in Chapter One, authors such as Baumeister (1987, 1991), Gergen (1991), and Giddens (1991)
generally convene in their conclusion that this age-long tendency has resulted in a growing
sensitivity for matters of personhood and a simultaneous discrediting of the notion of
personal authenticity. However, in their eagerness to sketch the sociohistorical background
of our problematic relation with issues of self and identity, these authors may have overstated
the rate with which the process of modernization has permeated all segments of society. In
their portrayal of previous eras, they mostly rely on historical and sociological generalizations
or on the cultural artifacts that have been preserved. For example, in his much cited review
of historical evidence pertaining to How the Self Became a Problem (1987), Baumeister draws
from historical literature as his primary source material, from the assumption that the
literature of a given era reflects the ‘current dilemmas of the human condition’ (p. 163). Yet,
it is rather dubious whether such alleged iconic sources are a true mirror of daily existence
in historic times. Over the centuries, literature has not only changed in its subject matter,
but just as well in its social functions. Should the observation that the medieval literature
2 The fate of the returning Vietnam veterans in the United States shows that this is a recurrent theme
throughout history.
87
tends to portray the inner life of their characters but in a very emblematic way – hero or
villain, pious or heretical – indeed be read as a sign that in those days people had an
unproblematic sense of self? Or has this mainly to do with the fact that secular medieval
literature was mainly written to edify and entertain its patrons, because in absence of a broad
readership those were the only ones wealthy enough to support a private writer (Huizinga,
1919/1990; Van Oostrom, 1996)? 
Such considerations directed Zeegers (1988, 1998) towards a less suspicious source
in the study of sociohistorical shifts in presentations and representation of the self: adds in
the lonely-hearts column in Dutch newspapers over the past forty years. Interestingly
enough, an extensive content analysis of these adds revealed that much of the sociohistorical
changes in our thinking about the self, ascribed to the age-long process of modernization,
have only very recently settled at the level of daily discourse. Whereas one’s social position
and material possessions were still a sufficient recommendation at the relational market in
the fifties (‘a good match’), in the sixties and seventies one had to appeal to the depths of
one’s personality (‘an intriguing person’) and in the eighties and nineties to give testimony
of one’s versatility as an individual (‘living life to the full’). Zeegers explained these trends in
terms of a progressive ‘psychologization’ and individualization of public discourse, levered
by successive social developments in Dutch society after World War II: a sharply increased
prosperity, the cultural rebellion against the bourgeois conventions in the sixties, the
unprecedented secularization and the sexual revolution of the seventies, and the increasing
emphasis on personal lifestyles and the immediate fulfillment of individual needs in the
eighties3. The observation that more than five centuries of Western cultural history seem to
condense in the restricted period of a few generations is not as surprising as it appears. Well
into this century, social life in The Netherlands was still characterized by small-scale
communities, social cohesion, collective traditions, and a restricted perspective on the
outside world, especially in the rural areas and country towns (c.f. Mak, 1996; Van den Brink,
1996). In such an environment, identity was conferred by one’s social position rather than
self-construed (Marcia, 1994). As a consequence, the older generations, having little
experience in playing with alternative identities, will probably feel less familiar with
generating and expressing personal information than those generations who had the
opportunity – or obligation – to account for their own lives.
The idiosyncrasy of life’s coincidences
The non-normative determinants, finally, constitute the third and last set of influences. They
refer to the biological and environmental vicissitudes that do not occur in any normative age-
graded or history-graded manner for most individuals. Especially radical life events – such
as death of a spouse, a serious accident, divorce, but also a career move, a relocation, starting
a relation – have the power to change one’s life course drastically. Such events are considered
non-normative, because they lack what Baltes and his colleagues (1980) have called
‘interindividual homogeneity in occurrence and patterning’ (p. 76). By definition, life events
3 As a matter of fact, these developments are not only typical for the Netherlands, but reappear as the
common symptoms in almost every diagnosis of self and identity in the late-modern, middle class societies of North-
west Europe and North America (c.f. Brewster-Smith, 1994; Cushman, 1990; Gergen, 1991; Giddens, 1991).
imply a disruption in the synchronization of individual and context. They exert a potentially
powerful influence on people’s lives just because “…they generate conditions that are less
predictable, less amenable to social control and support, and therefore may represent
extreme situations or challenge…” (Baltes et al., 1998, p. 1050). For the same reason, life
events may have an invalidating effect on the familiar constellation of self-images, role-
conceptions, and identifications that make out one’s personal identity (Brandtstädter, 1998;
Demo, 1992; Filipp & Klauer, 1986; Stephen et al., 1992). Sometimes, the disrupting effect
of life events can be so pervasive, as for instance with the sudden death of a spouse or being
fired, that they pose a serious threat to one’s sense of identity and throw the individual in a
chronic state of self-alienation (Breakwell, 1986, 1988). 
Yet, fortuitous events need not be that dramatic or disrupting to affect the course of
life in a decisive way. In an eloquent article on the psychological impact of chance
encounters, Bandura (1982) describes how life often takes its course despite rather than
through deliberate planning. In one of his examples, he talks of two male students who
decided to skip class for a game of golf. At the golf course, they found themselves in queue
with two female golfers who were playing the same holes. One of the male students was
Bandura and one of the female golfers eventually became his wife. For that matter, the
brilliant career of many an authority in the field of science actually turns out to be full of
coincidences too. As Breeuwsma (1993) describes, the famous developmentalist Heinz
Werner first decided to follow training as engineer, but quickly discovered that it fell short
of expectations. He switched over to musicology, but at his first day at the university he by
mistake ended up in an auditorium where Kant was taught. Inspired by what he heard, he
eventually decided to take up a study in philosophy and psychology.
According to Bandura, such real life examples show that, because of their unpredictable
nature, the actual occurrence of non-normative events refuses a systematic psychological
explanation. Nevertheless, developmental psychologists cannot neglect fortuitous events,
since their eventual impact on a person’s experiential world is anything but arbitrary. Often,
drastic life events as well as change encounters have a snowball effect. They can have the
result of ‘...branching people abruptly into new trajectories of life...’ (p. 753) by introducing
them in an entirely new niche of social opportunities. This new setting often works to
consolidate the changes that have taken place, for instance because it favors matching
configurations of life or because ensuing interactions tend to affirm the validity of the new
situation (Elder, 1998). When someone for instance looses her legs in a car crash, this does
not merely result in a permanent loss of physical mobility. It also leads to being caught up
in the accompanying paraphernalia of being an invalid, such as social stigmatization, a
lasting social dependence, the need for special housing facilities, and so on. It is eventually
the individual, who is the decisive factor in how such contingencies affect one’s biography.
Depending upon one’s resources and dispositions, non-normative events can for instance be
perceived as a challenge to bend the circumstances to one’s will, as facts of life one can only
resign to, or as a threat one dares not face (Breakwell, 1986, 1988; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984;
Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Whitbourne, 1996a, 1996b).
This brings us to a further reason why developmentalists should not ignore the role
of life’s coincidences. In biographical and autobiographical accounts, such episodes typically
constitute the key passages. From an idiographical stance, they often represent the all-
explanatory turning points in one’s life story (Bruner, 1990a, 1990b, 1997; Van Halen &
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Breeuwsma, in preparation). The discrepancy between the expert’s awkwardness and the
layman’s fondness in accounting for conspicuous events has to do with the different
functions of a formal and a biographical modeling of development (Breeuwsma, 1994;
Bruner, 1986, 1990b, 1995). Formal models of development focus primarily on the
regularities of development in order to predict the most likely trajectories, whereas the
function of life narratives rather is to make the occurred violations of the ordinary
comprehensible. As Bruner rightly argues, this difference in epistemic function does not
permit lifespan psychologists to simply jettison such folk psychological accounts as
subjective, superfluous constructions that stand in the way of a more objective explanation
of human development. Especially folk psychological accounts can become a defining
ingredient of one’s personal identity. They provide the kind of justification that finds broad
social approval, and from which one can derive a meaningful sense of coherence and
direction in life. They therefore play a vital role in sustaining a personal coordination of
lifespan development, that is, personal self-definition. 
4.4 The problem of dissecting lifespan development
Although the knowledge that the human life course is determined by an amalgamation of
age-graded, history-graded and idiosyncratic influences may correspond with the complexity
of the social reality in which people must learn to function as individuals, it also seems to
preclude any systematic description of development. For instance, how should we
understand the current trend of people who are in their forties and fifties and who no longer
seek meaning in life through a satisfactory working career or family life, but through the
pursuit of personal growth? Is it a typical symptom of a mid-life crisis, a fashionable lifestyle
of a sixties generation who has developed an unprecedented commitment to ‘new age’
philosophies, or a self-protective reaction to the uncertainties of life? Or is it a combination
of all three explanations, for instance a popular way of coping with personal circumstances
that most people at this age have in common in the present era?
Attributing a temporal change to one or more of these developmental factors can be
a precarious affair. Each set of determinants asks for a description of development at its own
level of generalization and time scale, each using its own explanatory devices (Breeuwsma,
1993, 1994; Featherman & Lerner, 1985). From the perspective of ontogenesis, the relevant
time scale is that of the human life cycle, and the focus is on uncovering strict age differences
through age-comparison. From the perspective of sociogenesis, the time scale is that of
changing societies and the focus is on establishing sociohistorical differences in trajectories
of development through cross-cultural and historical comparison. The study of event-related
temporal changes, finally, asks for a more idiographic comparison of the episodes that make
up a person’s biography. Because the human lifespan is in principle related to each of these
levels of aggregation, developmentalists must be concerned with choosing the most
appropriate level of explanation for the kind of temporal change that they describe. As a first
approximation, they can use a simple guideline. After all, the developmental consequences
of each set of influences can be recognized by its own temporal profile. The normative age-
graded determinants typically result in a fairly predictable pattern of developmental changes
that corresponds with the prototypical life cycle. Normative history-graded determinants
concur with broad shifts in the social and physical environment, influencing age-differences
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in a way that obeys the time span of historic events. Non-normative events, finally, can be
recognized as relatively unexpected ruptures in the individuals’ life histories. 
Yet, the apparent simplicity of this guideline conceals a serious methodological
complication, since most developmental research is only sensitive to systematic changes and
cannot discern age-effects from cohort-effects (Baltes, Reese & Nesselroade, 1988; Schaie,
1965). This has to do with the fact that most developmental studies apply either cross-
sectional or longitudinal designs, each having its own limitations. A cross-sectional
comparison of different age groups has the disadvantage of confounding age- and cohort-
effects, because each age group does not only represent a different life phase, but also the
historical period in which its members have grown up. Nor does a cross-sectional
comparison permit any conclusions about trajectories of intra-individual change, because
each age group is considered to be an independent sub-population. The usage of longitudinal
designs, on the other hand, is primarily aimed at following the temporal patterns in
individual trajectories. However, because each age group is followed only once, it is
impossible to draw firm conclusions about the stability of the occurred trajectories across
different historical periods.
In order to systematically separate age-effects from cohort-effects, it is necessary to
use so-called ‘cross-sectional sequences’ or ‘longitudinal sequences’ (Baltes et al., 1988;
Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998; Schaie, 1965, 1996). The key feature of sequential designs
is a repetition of the initial comparison. In a cross-sequential design, the same cross-sectional
comparison of different age groups is repeated with populations from successive years of
birth, this in order to assess the historical stability of currently found age-differences. In a
longitudinal sequential design, the same longitudinal wave is repeated for successive birth
cohorts to assess the historical stability of intra-individual patterns of change. Unfortunately,
the practical feasibility of sequential designs will often greatly exceed the available financial
and organizational means of most research groups. A study into lifespan development would
literally take a lifetime, since the age range that is being studied asks for a corresponding
period of repeated measurements. Moreover, there is a high risk that theoretical and
methodological advancements in the field invalidate the initial research goals and
instruments before the intended period of repeated measurements has come to an end.
For practical reasons, then, researchers often have no other option than to fall back on
a post hoc interpretation of found age differences. In this, they can appeal to an additional
heuristic in the temporal profiling of the different determinants of lifespan development.
Baltes, Reese and Lipsitt (1980; see also Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998) have posited a
hypothetical, yet plausible model with which they are able to differentiate the relative impact
of age-graded, history-graded, and non-normative influences on lifespan development
according to age (see Fig. 4.2 p. 91). In this model, age-graded influences show a U-shaped
tendency over the lifespan, directly related to the relative importance of growth and decline
over the life cycle. Even for the human species, the maturational advancements in childhood
are so pervasive that they largely determine the pace and margins of development. In the stable
years of adulthood, when the process of maturation is completed, the other influences gain
the upper hand in shaping the course of development. This results in a lessened regularity
and universality of individual trajectories (see also Filipp & Klauer, 1986). Only at the end of
life, the same age-graded determinants regain their impact, though in an opposite direction.
In general, aging causes a considerable decline in physical and mental functioning, so that
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the compensating effects of using prosthetic devices and strategies become more and more
important in maintaining a satisfactory quality of life (Brandtstädter, 1998; Brandtstädter &
Greve, 1994). In terms of daily functioning, Baltes and his colleagues prefer to describe this
U-shaped ontogenetic pattern according to two antagonistic functions, that is, the single
function of growth and the composite function of maintenance/recovery and regulation of
loss (Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1998). In childhood, the developmental resources are
primarily geared towards growth, during adulthood towards maintenance and recovery of
functioning, and in old age more and more towards the regulation or management of loss.
Figure 4.2: The relative impact of age-graded, history-graded, and non-normative influences over the lifespan
Historical influences have their greatest impact on lifespan development during
adolescence and early adulthood, just when the ontogenetic changes have reached their
zenith. The aforementioned studies about the generation of the Great Depression (Elder,
1974) and the World War I generation (Wohl, 1979) already showed that the age at which
individuals are expected to become autonomous participants of social life are also the
formative years for their further attitude to life. This is also corroborated by studies on
autobiographical memory. In an overview of empirical evidence in this field (Rubin, Rahhal,
& Poon, 1998) was concluded that up to an high age, the age between 10 and 30 years is and
remains to be the most critical period in life. It is the life phase from which respondents
reported their most vivid recollections, to which most of their autobiographical and decisive
memories dated back to, when the most important world events were perceived to have
occurred, and when their cultural preferences have been shaped. The authors explain this
phenomenon by the fact that at this age people start to become actively involved in their social
environment. As a result of that, they encounter many novel events, which, just because they
are new, require a strong effort to integrate them in their personal world. It is also a period
in which identity choices must become firmly established. By shaping one’s niche and
adaptive style, the first crystallization of a cohesive choice pattern may be a discriminatory









& Shaffer, 1987). After this period in life, the relative power of cultural factors and resources
in shaping one’s behavior becomes smaller and smaller, because with age the mental and
social functioning of adults tend to crystallize, that is, become more dependent upon strongly
ingrained habits and routines (Baltes, 1997; Baltes et al., 1998). 
As people grow older, the impact of non-normative influences will gradually increase.
This is partly the indirect consequence of a lesser institutionalization as well as further
stabilizing of the adult life course. The receding influence of these age-graded factors leaves
more and more scope for the role of life experiences in creating intra- and inter-individual
plasticity in adult development. Furthermore, because of the cumulative effect of
idiosyncratic life choices, the inter-individual variation in the course of life-trajectories will
only increase (Breeuwsma, 1994; Bandura, 1982). As a consequence, Schroots defines the
process of aging as “...the process of increasing entropy with age in individuals, from which
disorder and order emerge” (1995, p. 57). He sees life-events as a possible disintegration of
the pre-existing structures of everyday functioning. Whether the aging individual’s functioning
will indeed collapse or transgress to a new level of integration, depends on the compensating
initiatives that are used to counteract the disruption of familiar habits of functioning, or, in
Baltes’ terms, succeeding in the adaptive task of maintenance/recovery and regulation of loss.
From this hypothetical profile follows that trajectories of lifespan development from
birth to adolescence will be strongly characterized by age-gradation, in adolescence
complemented by generational experiences, and during adulthood by increasing variation.
Only at the end of life, the developmental trajectories of individuals will gradually converge
in a renewed age-graded pattern, due to the constraining effects of aging.
Be that is it may, lifespan researchers must also take into account the fact that
plasticity is in more than one sense an equally intrinsic feature of human development. From
a phylogenetic point of view, it is important to note that humans have to grow up in an
environment in which the hazards of survival have for an important part been superseded
by the demands of enculturated life (c.f. Baltes et al., 1998). As a result, the human life course
is less and less defined by biological age, and more and more by the social structures,
institutions, and expectations. This social embedding makes the human life course liable to
sociohistorical developments. When our society gradually ceases to enforce homogeneity,
more individualistic orientations and re-orientations will become a more pervasive
ingredient of the adult life course. And with biological constraints and social standardization
becoming less compelling, the margins for more idiosyncratic circumstances automatically
increase (Neugarten, 1979). Simultaneously, as people are increasingly thrown upon their
own resources, they will be more susceptible to external sources of disruption. This puts
more weight to the person’s ability to take responsibility for the course of one’s own life. In
the end, then, we have returned to the Eriksonian identity crisis and the ways in which people
try to resolve the ensuing feelings of identity confusion. In the uncertain circumstances of
present-day life, with its strong appeal to individualism, the person’s coordinating activities
increasingly count as a autonomous basis of development. This is a central aspect of lifespan
development that we will take up in the next chapter. 
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